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Abstract 
The fifth enlargement of the European Union, apart from the most de-
manding in terms of preparation /iJr the candidates and EU institutions has 
been the most ambiguous in terms oj'potential impacts both on economic and 
political spheres. In this paper we try to identifY the directions oj' potential 
consequences based on the peTformance of the new countries during the pre-
accession period and the degree of preparation by the time of the first part of 
accession. The preliminary assessments show that EU and newcomers 
economies shall/ace a series of positive impacts in terms oj'growth, produc-
tivity, employment and competitiveness, though to difjerent degrees, while 
political and social conditions will continue to improve. The greatest chal-
lenge for EU policy makers, will continue being the assurance oj' socio-
economic stability during the biggest enlargement ever in EU, yet, with less 
intervention through an adjusted to the new needs decision making process. 
1. Introduction 
Up to now, the greatest part of the debate, for the European Union 
enlargement has been concentrated almost exclusively on questions of finan-
cial compatibility of the enlargement with the Union's budget, addressing 
mainly such questions as: a) whether the EU budget would be able to finance 
the inevitably increased expenses associated with the extension of the agri-
cultural, regional and cohesion EU policies to the CEECs; or b) how should 
this greater burden be distributed among the 15 incumbent members of the 
Union. Equally extensive scrutiny has been dedicated to the necessity, for the 
EU, to reform its institutional alTangements, to review its decision-making 
procedures and to COlTect some of its most controversial, and expensive poli-
cies, before the enlargement could take place. Lastly, the likely magnitudes 
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of the anticipated costs and benefits have been amply discussed and evalu-
ated, even if these exercises have been performed more for the incumbents 
EU members than for the applicant countries. 
Much lesser attention has been devoted, however, to the problem of 
evaluating the CEECs accession to the EU in terms of their own fundamental 
needs and peculiarities as "countries in transition" or, in other words, to the 
connection between the systemic transformation undertaken in these coun-
tries in the last decade and their eventual entry into the European Union as 
full members (apart from some exceptions). The appropriateness of EU 
membership for the transition countries is seldom discussed, but it is a very 
important issue since for any country acceding to the EU, the discretion of 
national policy-makers is considerably reduced a membership implies a ma-
jor transfer of national competences to the level of the Union, mostly in the 
fields of foreign trade, capital movements, financial markets, fiscal policy, 
regional policy, environmental policy, monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy. 
Enlargement offers the unique opportunity of ending the artificial divide 
which bas split the European continent into two for most of the past 60 years. 
Not only will individuals be able to move, study and work freely across fron-
tiers, but businesses and economies in central and Eastern Europe should 
prosper as a market-based economy takes root. Europe as a whole will also 
benefit economically and politically with the creation of a domestic market 
of 500 million people. 
The EU has already experienced four separate enlargements (in 1973, 
1981, 1986 and 1995) as it has grown from six to 15 members. But with 13 
candidate countries in the wings stretching from Estonia in the north to Tur-
key in the south, this is easi ly the most ambitious. The preparations that have 
to be made by both existing and potential members to meet such a challenge 
are huge. To take just purely economic considerations, the GDP per head in 
purchasing power standards as a percentage of existing EU levels ranges 
from 79 % in Cyprus and 68 % in Slovenia to 23 % in Bulgaria and 27 % in 
Latvia. 
Internally, the EU has to adapt its own policies, finances and procedures 
to prepare for a Union of 20 or more countries. The fi rst two challenges were 
met at the EU summit in Berlin in March 1999 when budgetary ceilings were 
set for all areas of EU spending up to 2006. These were accompanied by 
wide-ranging reforms to regional, social and agricultural expenditure. Deci-
sion-making procedures are also being streamlined. In addition, the Commis-
sion is coordinating various information campaigns to inform the public of 
the impl ications of enlargement. 
The EU summit in March 1999 made some 22 bi llion euro available for 
pre-accession support between 2000 and 2006 - double the amount allocated 
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during the 1990s (CEC, 1997, 1998b). In addition , the Union's budget will be 
ready for the fi rst accessions from 2002 onwards with some 57 billion euro 
specifically eamlarked for new Member States between 2002 and 2006. 
2. ED membership conditions 
Before a country can contemplate the possibility of joining the EU it 
must demonstrate that it satisfies the three basic membership criteria laid 
down at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 . These are: 
• The existence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
oflaw, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capac-
ity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; 
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including ad-
herence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Negotiations with six of the applicants - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Re-
public, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus - opened in March 1998. After receiv-
ing the green light from EU leaders at their Helsinki European Council meet-
ing in December 1999, formal negotiations were launched in mid - February 
2000 with another six candidate countries - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania and Slovakia. 
Although the access ion negotiations have been launched in two groups, 
each applicant is considered on its own merits. The Un ion has put in place a 
fully flexible, multi-speed access ion process where countries will be assessed 
on their own merits and join when they are able to meet all the obligations of 
membership. This is followed by detailed negotiations on the 31 individual 
policy chapters ranging from fisheries to external re lations. 
The Union has a number of specific pre-accession programs to help the 
candidates prepare for membership. The best-known and longest-running 
vehicle for channeling the financ ial and technical cooperation to the candi-
dates is PHARE. This program provides grants, rather than loans, and can be 
broken down into two main priorities. The fi rst, with some 30 % of the 
budget, is institution building to help national and regional administrations as 
well as regulatory and supervisory bodies familiarize themselves with EU 
objectives and procedures. The second, with 70 % of the budget, helps the 
candidates bring thei r industries and major infrastructure up to ED standards 
by mobilizing the investment required. The support is chiefly targeted at ar-
eas where EU norms and standards are becoming increasingly demanding: 
environment, transport , industrial plants, and quality standards in products 
and working conditions. 
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Other aid programs are specifically aimed at agricultural and rural devel-
opment and at transport and environmental projects. There are also programs 
to fight conuption and organized crime and to handle refugees and asylum 
seekers. 'In addition, numerous seminars and workshops for officials in the 
candidate countries are held on subjects as diverse as fiscal surveillance and 
customs clearance. 
While the European Union has taken the lead in helping candidate coun-
tries prepare for membership, it is not alone. Other international bodies lend 
their SUppOlt and expertise: the World Bank, the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the Council of Europe and the Nordic Council. 
A patticular case is Turkey, for which fonnal relations with the Union 
date back to the 1963 association agreement and the country was the first of 
the cunent group of applicants to apply for EU membership back in 1987. 
For a variety of political, economic and human rights reasons, the request 
made little progress over the years , until the Helsinki Summit in December 
1999. At that meeting, EU Governments formally recognized the country's 
status by agreeing that ' Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union 
on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States '. 
As a result, the country benefits from a pre-accession strategy and part-
nership to stimulate and support its political and economic reforms and a 
closer pol itical dialogue with the Union. It is able to participate in existing 
EU programs and in meetings between the candidates and the Union and is 
being helped to bring its own domestic legislation into line with the EU's 
rules and practices. But before actual accession negotiations may begin, Tur-
key must first demonstrate its respect for human rights and restructure many 
elements of the country's economy. Given the historical fl-iction between 
Turkey and its Aegean neighbor, Greece, the Union has specifically called 
for the peaceful settlement of any outstanding border disputes and other re-
lated issues, such as Cyprus. Alongside Turkey ' s EU membership aspira-
tions, a customs union with a 15 million euro budget already links the two 
and the Union is making available a further 135 million euro to promote the 
country's economic and social development. Enlargement must not lead to 
new baniers 
Enlargement also raises questions about how the Union will organize its 
relationships with countries facing a longer road towards membership. The 
Commission has Hoated the concept of virtual membership to give Albania 
and fOlmer Yugoslavia, for instance, the stimulus and advantages of various 
forms of close cooperation even before they are ready for accession. But to 
benefit from these, they would have to meet certain criteria. These include 
recognition of each other's borders, settlement of all outstanding issues relat-
ing to the treatment of minorities and the establishment of a regional coop-
eration organization. This would encourage economic integration by creating 
The impact of EU enlargemen!_ on cU/_T_e'_zt ___ _ 45 
a free trade zone and then a customs union which could Later merge with the 
EU's own customs union as a first step towards accession. 
3. Some thoughts on problems to be faced. 
The enlargement of the European Union is one of the challenges that 
European Countries will face in the years ahead. A precondition to cope with 
this task in an efficient way is to get a comprehensive picture of the conse-
quences of this enlargement. There is little doubt that its overall impact will 
be positive in the long run, due to an enlarged market, an improved division 
of Labour, and the dynamic forces of increased competition. However, tbis 
will not necessarily be true for all sectors, regions, and types of enterprises; 
especially during the initial pbase of integrating new members into the EU. 
The discussion about "sensitive" sectors such as textiles or agricultural, and 
the special treatment they have received under the "Europe agreements", hint 
at some of the existing adaptation problems. However, there are not only 
specific risks but also specific opportunities, whereby some sectors, regions, 
and types of enterprise will benefit more by the enlargement than others 
(CEC, 2000), (ENSR, 1996, 1998) . 
In particular, some principal questions pose difficulties to an assessment 
of the consequences of enlargement. First, the EU will experience a "stag-
gered" enlargement, as not all countries that apply for membership will enter 
the Union at the same time. Second, enlargement will not take place at a spe-
cific time, but it will be a process taking several years, some measures al-
ready coming in force in a pre-membership phase, others long after the 
membership is achieved due to transition periods. Trade barriers, e.g. , be-
tween the candidate countries and the existing Community, have aLready 
been eliminated to a large extent, whereas experience from earlier enlarge-
ments suggests that in some sensitive areas the "aquis communitaire" will be 
fully applied 10 years after accession or even later. Third, there also are de-
lays between impulse and impact. Thus, the consequences of enlargement 
will be felt over a relatively long period, making it difficult to assess when 
changes expected in the long run will come into force. Another problem oc-
curs, as the international environment does not stay constant during the proc-
ess of enlargement. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the effects of eco-
nomic integration in Europe from wider global trends in some sectors (e.g. 
restructuring in the clothing and textiles industries). Insofar, this paper often 
can only give the directions enlargement will influence the development of 
regions or industries, but it cannot quantify these effects. 
Although there is no doubt in the European political arena and its eco-
nomic and business sectors, that this complex exercise will come to fruition, 
it is also true that, until recently, the citizens of Europe had reservations and 
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concerns before the magnitude of the challenge, This paradoxical state of 
affairs was clearly reflected in the Euro-barometer of Autumn 2000, which 
showed that only 44% of the European public opinion favored enlargement, 
when~as 35% was against it and 21% with no clear position on the matter. 
The reason for this puzzling figures can be found in the answer to another 
poll question: 83% of Europeans believed that they were little or badly in-
formed on the development of the enlargement process, and only 17% had 
enough understanding of the matter. To remedy the situation, the Commis-
sion has just updated its communication strategy, by means of de-
centralization and by the inclusion of the civil society, both in the Member 
States and the candidate countries, 
Since then, the situation has improved, probably influenced of further 
clarification of the enlargement perspective, The last Euro-barometer pub-
lished in June already shows a 50% positive response, with 30% detractors 
and 20% undecided, Furthermore, the percentage of people in favor of 
enlargement in E,U, countries such as Germany, UK or Austria, surpasses 
that of those against it. In Spain, the situation is quite comfortable, with 64% 
in favor and only 14% against. 
The peculiar nature of this fi fth enlargement stems from two main spe-
cific circumstances, On the one hand, there is the number factor, since we are 
negotiating with 12 countries at the same time. Until now, the maximum 
number of simultaneous accessions did not exceed three, Such was the case 
in 1973, with the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Similarly, the 
last enlargement of 1995 included Finland, Sweden and Austria. In 1981, 
there was the single accession of Greece and in 1986 Spain and POliugal 
joined the E.U. On the other hand, as opposed to previous enlargements, we 
are at present dealing with a truly diverse group of countries in terms of size, 
population, history, culture, ethnic composition and degree of development. 
Moreover, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, these countries are in-
volved in a deep process of transformation and restructuring of their econo-
mies and at the end of the consolidation of their democratic systems. 
Added to these initial difficulties , greater than those faced by previous 
candidates, are a number of demanding conditions and precise requirements 
that candidate countries must fulfilL These were established in 1993 at the 
European Council of Copenhagen and include a whole set of political, eco-
nomic and institutional criteria which are deciding factors when evaluating 
the degree of preparation for accession of individual candidates. 
But, enlargement is not just demanding for the candidate countries, The 
EU must also be prepared to rise to the challenge, In this context, there are 
two critical issues that must be underlined. In December 1997, the European 
Council of Luxemburg, decided to initiate a reform of the institutions, in or-
der to adapt them to the new circumstances. As a result, the Treaty of Nice, 
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adopted two years later, allowed for the participation of future Member 
States in the different institutions of the Union, including the re-weighing of 
their respective vote. This process is still open and currently under way with 
the Convention set up to prepare the next Intergovernmental Conference for 
2004. 
No less important is the budgetary adjustment of the EU. In March 1999, 
the Council of Berlin adopted the new financial perspectives, based on the 
Agenda 2000 and effective for the period 2000-2006. Among them were two 
new headings, number seven in relation to pre-accession aid and number 
eight concerning the resources specifically allocated to the new partners. The 
amounts that appeared in each of them are, 21.840 Million Euros and 51.070 
Million Euros, respectively. 
The complexities also extend to the negotiating process per se. Its con-
tents refer to transposition and effective application of the totality of the ac-
quis, which has been divided into 30 chapters for practical purposes. The 
assumption by each candidate country of a reliable commitment in this sense 
allows the provisional closure of each chapter. In some cases, whenever jus-
tified, transitional periods can be accepted, provided that they are limited in 
time, as well as in their area of application and in their impact on EU regula-
tions. A specific deadline for their conclusion should also be established. 
In addition, many actors are involved in this process. The Commission, 
together with each candidate country, is responsible for the detailed examina-
tion of the acquis, the preparation and submission to the Council of the draft 
common positions on the different chapters of the negotiation and finally, the 
preparation and proposal of the overall negotiating strategy. The Member 
States, in turn, must examine and, whenever necessary, review the project 
presented by the Commission for its fi nal adoption, in accordance with the 
unanimity rule. The candidate countries are then provided with the different 
common positions that must be individually negotiated in successive meet-
ings of the Accession Conferences. Where agreement is reached, the chapter 
is provisionally closed. This means that it is possible to reopen it, if required. 
Last but not least, the European Parliament carries out a continuous follow-
up of the whole process and receives regular reports from the Counci l's 
Presidency and the Commission. 
It cannot be denied that the candidate countries must face a number of fi-
nancial, social and also political burdens as a result of the internal reform that 
needs to be achieved to successfully conclude negotiations. The transitional 
periods under negotiation in especially sensitive chapters (such as free circu-
lation of persons and capitals, competence, justice, environment, tmwtion, 
energy or transpoli, to mention only some) should soften the blow delivered 
by these extensive transfonn ations. Nevertheless, the direct benefits derived 
L. 
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from accession will be felt rather quickly in the growth potential of these 
countries. 
The advantages derived from enlargement are unquestionable. Suffice it 
to remember that after the accession of the present candidates, the Union's 
internal Market will increase to a population of 500 million inhabitants, fa-
cilitating all kinds of exchanges within that common economic space, creat-
ing additional job oPPOItunities and, ultimately, bringing about greater 
growth and improving the standard of liv ing fDr all the European peoples. At 
the same time, there will be an increase in competitiveness, especially in 
those sectors more dependent on manual labor and natural resources, which 
will inevitably lead to higher levels of quality, productivity and business 
management. 
In June 2001, a Commission report on the macroeconomic effects of 
enlargement evaluated that the average increase of the candidates' joint 
growth rate will range between 1,3% and 2% during the 2000-2009 period, 
as a consequence of reforms and restructuring currently underway, which 
wi ll translate into better allocation of resources and increased productivity 
and investment (Brown and Raines, 2000). There are three main sources of 
such growth: higher levels of investment due to transfers fi·om the E.U. and 
to increased direct foreign investment; larger workfDI'ce as a result of a raise 
in the participation rate within the labor market; and lastly, an increase in 
overall productivity caused not only by changes in the sectoral composition 
of production but also by the implementation of the necessary structural re-
fDnns which will allow the appropriate level of performance in a single Mar-
ket as competitive as that of the EU. 
To a lesser extent, the current Member States will also experience an 
additional average increase of their joint growth rate, which can be estimated 
at 0,5%-0,7% for the same period. This will come as a result of enhanced 
commercial integration and of manual labor imports from the candidate 
countries. One cannot hide the fact that the advantages will not be evenly 
distributed, and that those who will benefit more are the ones who already 
have stronger relations with the candidate countries. 
All in all, enlargement does not end here. It is more than a mere exten-
sion of the internal Market in its present form. The advantages will not be of 
an exclusively economic nature. Equally or even more important, there will 
be political benefits derived from the consolidation of democratic systems 
and the respect for human rights in the candidate countries, in accordance 
with the strict criteria established in Copenhagen Furthennore, they will en-
joy positive changes in the social and environmental spheres, through their 
endeavors to meet the standards of the Union. Finally,as a result of the 
events of September 11 in the US, there has been a significant strengthening 
of cooperation in security matters and the fight against terrorism, which has 
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sped up the integration of the candidate countries in the area of freedom, se-
curity and justice, pertaining to the third pillar of the EU. 
It can of course be expected that such a complex and difficult exercise 
will be accompanied by uncertainties. Along the way, political contingencies 
emerge, in particular electoral processes in candidate countries and Member 
States, which can affect the whole process. Another factor to be reckoned 
with is the shifting mood of European public opinion on enlargement issues, 
which, as already mentioned, requires great additional efforts and more in-
tensive information campaigns to dispel reservations and concerns. Last but 
not least, the possibility of "accidents" should be factored in, such as the out-
come of the Referendum in Ireland over the ratification of the Treaty of Nice, 
or, more recently, the tragic events of September 11. 
3. Impact of Enlargement on the Union 
3.1. Macroeconomic aspects 
The consequences of Eastern enlargement for sectors, regions, and 
companies in the Union very much depend on the macroeconomic 
environment at the time it occurs (see RWI in co-operation with EPRC, 
1997). In particular, the growth path of the economy in the EU - as well as in 
the accession states - is crncial to the way and the possibilities all enterprises 
can adjust to the challenges ahead. Companies' reactions to increasing 
pressure from abroad as well as how they utilize new chances offered by the 
enlarged market will be highly dependent upon their expectations about 
growth. In a high growth environment it will be easier for them to absorb 
shocks, but there might also be less stimulus to seize opportunities in new 
markets. Where growth rates are low, on the other hand, companies will face 
pressure to adjust from the intemal and the external side at the same time, so 
that many might be forced to exit the market. However, some companies -
above all the most competitive ones - might seek even more intensively for 
opportunities in foreign rnarkets. Therefore, it is appropriate to start this 
study with some consideration of the growth scenario for the EU as a whole 
as well as for the accession countries. These will be followed by an 
assessment of the impact of Eastern enlargement on growth. 
3.2. Growth perspectives in the EU 
Over the last two decades, the economy of the European Union as a 
whole grew at an average annual rate 2.1 %, showing a slightly upward 
trend. Changes in employment as well as productivity contributed to this 
50 European Research Studies, Volume 7, Issue (1-2), 2004 
.. ------------
growth though the lion's share can be explained by productivity (CEC 
1998a). Its annual growth is remarkably stable with an average rate of 1.9 %. 
It accounts for about four-fifths of GDP growth. Employment on the other 
hand only grew slightly. The average annual growth rate has been well under 
0.5 %. Nevelt heless, there are some hints that employment trends are im-
proving, not least due to deregulations in the labor market that many EO 
countries have undertaken in recent years. 
Taking into account these tendencies, it seems plausible to assume that 
growth in the EO will follow a path of 2.5 % per annum during the years in 
which EO enlargement will take place. There is some room for higher 
growth, e.g. if improvements in the labor market continue; there are also 
some risks, given that demographic factors will lead to a decrease of labor 
force. However, an average annual GDP growth of 2.5 % underlies the EO 
Commission's calculations on the impact of EO-Enlargement on the Struc-
tural Funds, too (CEC 1997: 87). Furthermore, projections by other institu-
tions, e.g. by the World Bank, support this growth scenario. The World Bank 
forecasts a 2.5 % annual growth of GDP in the European G4 
All in all, the European economy will grow at a moderate rate that will 
be well under the rates experienced in the 1960s; but there are no signs that 
growth trends will be directed downward. Hence, companies in the EO will 
have to adjust to opportunities and challenges of the EO enlargement in an 
economic environment that is characterized by stable economic conditions. 
3.3 Growth perspectives in the accession states 
Concerning growth perspectives, the five Central European accession 
states (CEEC) on the one hand and Cyprus on the other are in different posi-
tions. Since 1994, the five Eastern European accession states show a re-
markably solid economic development (Table 1). They succeeded to over-
come the trough of the transformation crisis quite quickly and returned to 
economic growth. Of course, the five countries are not homogenous: growth 
rates in Poland and Slovenia were relatively high in the mid-1990s, showing 
some signs of fatigue only recently. In Hungary, on the other hand, growth 
was rather sluggish for many years, but the economy seems to have reached a 
steeper growth path now. Estonia ' s growth has been the strongest among the 
five countries in the last two years, with an exceptional rate in 1997. The 
Czech Republic, finally, slipped into recession in 1998, not least because 
structural reforms were not pushed forward as necessary in the early years of 
transformation. All in all, real GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 
4.5 % since 1994. 1998 was the first year showing a rate below 4 %, above 
all due to the Czech development. 
Table 1. Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in the Accession States 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real Gross Domestic Product!, annual change, % 
Czech Republic - 1.2 - 14.2 -8 -0.9 2.6 4.8 3.9 -2.7 
Estonia -14.2 -8 .5 -1.8 4.3 4 11.4 5.4 
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5. 1 
Poland -11.6 -7 2.6 3.8 5.2 7 6.1 6.8 4.8 
Slovenia -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1 3.8 4.4 
CEEC Totall -7.7 -9.4 -1.2 2 4.3 5.4 4.6 5.1 3.4 
Cyprus n.a. 0.7 9.4 0.7 5.9 6.1 1.9 2.5 5 
Consumer Prices2 annual change %, 
Czech Republic 9.5 56.7 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 
Estonia 1075.9 35.7 47.7 29 23 .1 11.2 8.2 
Hungary 28.9 35 23 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 
Poland 585 .8 76.7 45.3 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.9 
Slovenia 550 117.7 201.3 32.3 19.8 12.6 9.7 8.4 8 
CEEC Totall 376.7 68 .9 55.7 30.1 24.9 23.1 17.6 13.7 11.7 
Cyprus n.a. 5 6.5 4.9 4.7 2.6 3 3.6 2.2 
Unemployment3 rate, % 
Czech Republic 0.8 4 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 
Estonia 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.2 
Hungary 1.9 7.5 12.3 12.1 lOA lOA 10.7 lOA 9.1 
Poland 6.3 11.8 12.9 16A 16 14.9 13.2 10.5 lOA 
Slovenia 5.8 10.1 13A 15A 14.2 14.5 14A 14.8 14.5 
CEEC Tota13 4.6 9.6 10.6 12.9 12.3 11.6 10.7 9A 9.6 
Cyprus 1.8 3 1.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 3.1 n.a. n .a . 
Source: National statistical offices. - IGDP-weights 1998. - 2National Definitions, end of the year quotas - "Weight: Total 
.e.f!12}().lment 1997 
1-----.- --
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Although preliminary 1999 figures suggest that expansion will be lower 
than in the years before, some additional indicators make evident that growth 
is based on rather solid ground. Inflation, although still high compared the 
EU figures; is coming down considerably. In 1999, it was under 10 % in all 
five countries for the first time. In general, labor markets show signs of im-
provement as well. On average, unemployment rates have been coming down 
since 1993 and do not differ very much from the EU average, even if differ-
ences in definitions might make comparisons difficult. Finally, growth is ~ 
except in the Czech Republic ~ increasingly borne by capital formation (Ta-
ble 2). Thus, restructuring of capital stocks is evident, creating a more solid 
platform for fu ture growth. 
Therefore, it can be expected that GDP growth in the accession states 
will remain above EU rates. In its calculations for the Agenda 2000, the EU 
assumed an annual growth in these countries of 4 % (CEC 1997: 78). It is 
difficult to assess whether this scenario is realistic. On one hand, growth has 
weakened in most countries recently, which in part hints at shortcomings in 
the transformation. Fixed capital formation, although ~ as already pointed out 
~ growing, is still low compared to economies that successfully reduced their 
backlog against the industrialized countries. In any case, the weakening of 
growth also reflects developments in the international environment such as 
the Asian crisis and the developments in Russia, which should have no last-
ing influence. However, there is some risk that growth will be lower in fu-
ture . On the other hand, there also is the chance that economic expansion will 
become stronger. The accession countries to some extent are in a position 
many Western European economies were in after World War II. Only by 
adopting technologies that are already available in the rest of the world they 
might be able to close the technological gap and increase productivity very 
quickly, leading to relatively high rates of growth (c.f. Dumke 1990). 
In Cyprus, growth is less steady, but inflation and unemployment lower. 
However, as the economy is rather small ~ Cyprus population is 0.74 mil-
lions only ~ the impact of the growth scenario on the EU is negligent. 
Table 2. Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in GDP in the Accession States 1992-1997, % 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Czech Republic 28.0 29.6 32.8 33.0 30.7 28.1 
Estonia 20.9 24.4 27.0 26.0 26.7 
Hungary 19.9 18.9 20.1 19.1 21.5 22.3 23.4 
Poland 16.8 15.9 16.2 16.9 19.0 2l.2 22.1 
Slovenia 18.8 20.1 21.4 22.5 23.5 24.2 
Cyprus 25.7 22.6 20.6 19.3 20.4 18.5 18.0 
Source: TMF and national statistical offices. 1998 estimate 
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Concerning the consequences of EU enlargement, the benefits will be the 
greater the stronger the economies of the acceding countries will be, for the 
economy as a whole. A strong economy in the accession countries means: 
more opportun ities to increase exports to the acceding countries, better con-
ditions for companies in Eastern Europe in their home market, diminishing 
the pressure to export; and lower subsidies that must be paid to the accession 
states and financed by taxpayers in the EU. 
As already stated above, the overall impact of EU enlargement can be 
expected to be positive for sides, the EU as well as the acceding countries. 
Despite this clear tendency, it is difficult to quantify a general impact, al-
though many studies have been published on the consequences of EU 
enlargement. Nevertheless, handy estimates of the overall consequences in 
terms of higher growth rates, more employment, or lower unemployment 
rates are not available, not least because most analyses concentrate on theo-
retical or on specific regional and sectoral (e.g. agriculture) aspects. 
However, to assess the consequences of enlargement for SMEs it is 
impoliant to get some idea of overall growth effects, as higher growth in the 
end also means better economic conditions for all companies. A rough esti-
mate can be derived from the size of the acceding countries relative to the 
EU. In terms of population, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovenia come close to 17 % of EU population. Consequently, the 
enlargement will expand the number of consumers in the EU considerably. 
On the other hand, GDP of the six countries amounts only about 3 % (1997) 
of EU GDP. For comparison: when Spain and Portugal joined to the EU in 
1986, their GDP was 8.1 % of EU GDP at that time. This makes evident that 
these consumers still have little income at their disposal. Therefore, the mac-
roeconomic impact of the Eastern enlargement will be rather limited for the 
European Union, at least in the first years after the accession, as the utiliza-
tion of growth effects also will need time. Looking at trade, this view is sup-
ported strongly: in 1998, total EU exports to the accession country were ECU 
71.3 billion, which is less than one percent of EU GOP. 
After an enlargement of the un ion, exports are likely to be much higher, 
giving an impulse for growth. However, at the same time imports from the 
new members will rise more rapid ly too, and thus reduce the expansionary 
effects of growing exports. Even if the trade surplus of the EU will persist for 
some time, and even allowing for some multipl ier effects and taking into 
consideration that restructuring of the division of labor between the ol.d and 
new EU members might lead to a better growth performance: the macroeco-
nomic impact from trade will be limited after all , although positive. 
Indeed, model simulations by Baldwin et al. (1997) generate a rather 
small expansionary impulse from the EU enlargement. This impulse is under 
their estimate of costs for the EU members that will arise through refonns of 
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the agricultural and structural policy. A dynamic simulation of the macro-
economic consequences of an enlargement as agreed in the Agenda 2000 has 
been made for Austria, covering gains and costs of an enlargement as well 
(Breuss, Schebeck 1998). The calculations are based on the assumption that 
the five Eastern European countries will enter the Union in 2002. After four 
years, in 2006, the study expects Austrian GDP to be 0.8 %-points higher as 
it would have been without the enlargement, the annual growth about 0.2 %-
points higher. As main factor an increase in competition seems to contribute 
to growth, as prices will be lower to nearly the same extent as real economic 
activity rises. 
Other simulations were presented by Keuschnigg et al. (1999) for Ger-
many, and Keuschnigg/Kohler (1999) for Austria, using computable general 
equilibrium models. In the Gern1an case, their simulations suggest that GDP 
will be 0.4 % higher in the long run, what again is a slight impact only, hav-
ing in mind that the total effect will be realized piecemeal over an adjustment 
period that covers several years . In the case of Austria, the impact will be 
stronger (1.1 % of GDP in the long run), which does not differ too much 
from the results cited above. 
The impact on growth in the access ion countries will be higher as those 
in the EU. Baldwin et al. estimate - again considering static effects only -
that under "conservative assumptions" real income in the Eastern European 
countries will be 1.5 % higher compared to the situation before entering the 
EU. In a "less conservative case", taking into account that membersh ip in the 
EU w ill lower the risk premium the accession countries have to bear and 
therefore, will have a positive effect on investment, they even conclude that 
the impact of enlargement on Eastern European real income will be 18.8 % -
again compared to a non-membership scenario. 
The expo11s of the EU to the six countries analyzed here increased be-
tween 1993 and 1998 at an annual rate of 24 %, whereas imports grew by 22 
%, meaning that the EU is increasingly in a surplus position (Eurostat, 1998). 
As already noted, the driving force behind this development was the restruc-
turing of trade, i.e. the shift from the fonnerly predominant trade with part-
ners in Eastern Europe towards the ED. It was partly spurred by the Europe 
Agreements and the liberalization of trade between the accession candidates 
and the EU. In particular, EU imp0l1 duties have been cut mainly between 
1992 and 1997. Not all EU-members were able to raise their exports to East-
ern Europe to the same extent, and the same is true for imports as well. Some 
members' links to the acceding countries were very close at the beginning of 
the 1990s. In particular, the shares of Germany, Austria, and Italy were 
markedly above their importance for total extra EU trade. These countries 
could realize an under-propOltionate increase in their exports to the acceding 
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countries only, with Germany and Austria still remaining clearly above total 
expOli share, and Italy slipping behind (Table 3). 
Table 3. EU-Trade with the Accession States by Country 
1993 - 1997, shares in 0/0) EU Exports EU Imports 
1993 1997 1997/93 1 1993 1997 1997/931 
Austria 12.4 9.4 18.4 10.6 9.6 19.6 
Belgium/Luxemburg 4.4 4.2 25 2.9 3.2 25 .6 
Denmark 2.6 1.9 16.3 2.7 2.2 16.7 
Finland 3.2 3.6 30.6 2.5 2 15.9 
France 8.2 7.7 25 8 6.2 14.7 
Genllany 53.5 42.7 20. 1 60 50.1 17.1 
Greece 0.5 0.3 13.7 0.8 0.6 13.7 
Ireland 0.4 0.6 42 0.4 0.3 14.9 
Italy 15.1 12.5 21.1 12.3 9.9 16.1 
Netherlands 6.6 4.9 18.1 5.4 5.1 21 
Portugal 0.1 0.2 52.4 0.2 0.2 24.2 
Spain l.9 2.4 34.6 1.4 1.7 29.6 
Sweden 2.8 3.4 34.1 2.5 3.1 28.9 
United Kingdom 6.6 6.1 24.4 6 5.8 21.5 
EU total 100 100 27 100 100 22.5 
Source: EUROSTAT. 1 
The highest increases of exports - though, or just because, they started 
from a very low level -- experienced Portugal and Ireland, followed by Swe-
den and Spain. The latter shows the highest increase of imports from the five 
Eastern European Countries. At the lower end, with regard to expOlis as well 
as imports, Greece can be located. Generally speaking, the differences be-
tween EU members in the expansion of imports are somewhat smaller than 
those for the exports. Astonishingly, France as well as the UK realized an 
under-proportionate increase of their exports to the accession countries, de-
spite starting from a low level of trade. These discrepancies can be explained 
by many factors, among which are the diverging starting levels as well as 
(geographical and cultural) proximity. An important detenninant, however, is 
the sectoral composition of the industries, both in the exporting and the im-
porting countries and the structure of demand. The better the structure of ex-
ports by product in one country fits into the structure of impOlis of another, 
the higher will be the trade between the two. According to this logic, similar-
ity between export patterns on the one hand and import patterns on the other 
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can be used to measure the trade-creating effects of an EU enlargement, as 
similar trade patterns mean that the exporter offers just those goods that the 
importer demands. The export spectrum of Austria, Germany, Sweden, and 
Italy seems to fit very well into the import needs of the accession countries. 
Trade between the EU and the six potential new members shows more and 
more an intra-industry pattern. Increasingly, both regions export the same 
types of products. 
Less favorable for exploiting the trade creating effects are the export 
structures of Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, Denmark and Finland, as well as 
Greece, the latter showing the lowest index of correspondence by far. It can 
be expected that enlargement will benefit these countries less than others in 
the EU (Bachtler, Taylor and Kearney, 1996). 
These regional effects partly mirror the industries that can be found in 
these countries. The six countries analyzed are competitive with a relatively 
small number of products, showing either high or at least increasing RCA-
values and a relevant share in total exports to the EU. In nearly all countries, 
four product categories can be found: articles if apparel, mechanical machin-
ery, electronic products, and vehicles. Three countries, among which Poland 
can be found, that have the highest exports to the EU among the countries 
analyzed, are competitive with wood, wooden products, and furniture. The 
remaining categories, mainly agricultural or metal products, are classified as 
competitive only in rare cases. Thus, import competition will concentrate on 
a rather limited, but nevertheless important part of the EU manufacturing 
sector. 
Enlargement will also influence the flow offactors, i.e. of labor and capi-
tal. Before 1990, investment of EU countries in Eastern Europe was actually 
almost non-existent, except the then Yugoslavia which was more open to 
foreign investors . In the case of Germany, for example, which was and still is 
the mostlmportant investor, PDI stocks in Poland were about 5 million ECU 
in 1989, and in Hungary 36 million ECU both being less than 0.05 % of total 
German PDI. Since then, FDI in Eastern Europe in general has risen consid-
erably, and the five accession states were preferred locations to invest. Tak-
ing the inflows reported by the five countries considered as a yardstick, most 
of the increase in FDI took place before 1995 (Table 4). Since then, total for-
eign investment was stagnant, although significant shifts took place between 
the countries, with Poland taking the leading role from Hungary. 
Most of this investment came from the EU, in Hungary about 63 %, in 
the Czech Republic and in Poland more than 70 %. With respect to the sec-
toral structure, significant differences between the Eastern European coun-
tries exist, above all reflecting different privatization strategies. In Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and Slovenia a good deal of the investment went to the 
electricity, gas and water sector (Table 5), another large share in the tele-
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communication sector (Czech Republ ic 18%, Hungary 9%). In Poland, the 
manufacturing sector is dominant (45%). Interestingly, about one-fifth of 
FDI in the manufacturing sector ~ except in Slovenia ~ was made in the food 
industry, indicating that investments primarily aimed at developing new 
markets. In Slovenia, finally, considerable FDI was allocated in financial 
services. 
Table 4. Foreign Direct Investment in the Accession States 
1992 - 1998; US$ mill 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Czech Republicl 988 568 862 2568 1435 1287 2554 
Poland 678 1715 1875 3659 4498 4908 6363 
Hungary 1479 2339 11 45 4519 1982 2080 [936 
Slovenia I II l13 128 176 185 321 165 
Estonia 82 162 21 4 20 1 150 266 581 
Total CEEC 3338 4897 4225 11 123 8251 8862 11599 
Cypms 107 83 75 80 48 64 37 
Source: IMF, EBRD. National Sources. ~ lWithout FDI-relations between the 
Czech and the Slovak 1992 estimate. 
Table 5. Foreign Direct Investment in Accession Countries by Sedor 
-~.----~~~~.-.-. 
Czech Hungary Poland Slovenia Republic 
-1997 -1996 -1996 -191)7 
Agriculture & Fishing 0.1 1.2 0.2 n.a. 
Mining & Quarrying I.3 0.4 n.a. 
Man ufacturing 41.9 38.8 45 30 
Food products 11.6 9.5 11 2 
Textiles and wood activities 5.2 4.4 5.9 7 
Petroleum, chemical, mbber and 7.7 8.5 7.8 6 
plastic products 
Metal and mechanical products 4.9 4.6 4.1 5 
Office machinery, computers, radio, n.a. 5.1 0.9 n.a. 
Vehicles and other transport equ. 12.5 2.5 7.2 n.a. 
Water 8.9 14.8 0.1 14 
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Construction 7.4 3.9 l.6 n.a. 
Trade and Repairs 8.9 11.9 11.6 11 
Hotels and Restaurants n.a. 2.4 0.4 n.a. 
Transport and Communication 18.2 9.2 2.4 n.a. 
Financial activities 9.4 9.3 11.1 17 
Real estate and business activities n.a. 7.1 2.9 13 
Other Services n.a. 0.5 0.2 n.a. 
Not classified 4.1 -0.3 24.2 15 
Sourcs'2~ CD, UNCT!.'D 
-~ 
3.4. Jvlacroeconomic and sectoral effects 
The enlargement of the European Union will have a positive impact on 
the economy in its existing as well as its new members; even if these effects 
are difficult to identify. Some have already come into force under the Europe 
Agreements; others will be realized long after the accession having taken 
place due to transition periods. Their economic environment will improve for 
various reasons. The market will become larger, division of labor w ill be 
improved, and the increased competition will bring about dynamic forces. 
All these factors will result in generally higher incomes and thus create op-
portunities for expansion. Neve11heless, all model simulations published 
hitherto suggest that the gains for the existing Union will be modest. 
However, competition is the clue to realizing the growth potential of 
enlargement. This necessarily means that the adjustment to the new integra-
tion area and the new division of labor will bring about winners as well as 
losers. On a sectoral level, we identified both "oppOliunity sectors" as well as 
"risk sectors". In manufacturing, both types of sectors overlap to a large ex-
tent when looking at broad categories. Going more into detail, risk sectors 
are characterized above all by high labour intensity, as the availability of 
cheap labor has been the main source of comparative advantage of the acces-
sion countries. Therefore, competition from the accession countries rose par-
ticularly in branches that require little human capital. But the labor force in 
the potentially new members is well educated as a rule, so that in addition, 
some more "ski lls-intensive" sectors might come under pressure, too. In the 
service sector, information about trade between the EU and the accession 
countries is less detailed. The figures avai lable suggest that advantages of the 
EU can be found in the fi eld of business and financial services, whereas 
among the accession countries' exports tourism and transportation services 
are dominant. 
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3.5. Border and non-border region effects 
For the border regions, the enlargement will influence the integration 
into the international division of labor substantially. However, many produc-
tion relocations have already taken place since the fall of the iron curtain. 
The overall effect is regarded as positive, with benefits outweighing the 
costs, though the scale of the benefits may depend on the timing of enlarge-
ment (European Parliament, 1996). One aspect of accession, which will have 
unique effects on the border regions, is labor migration. Cross-border com-
muting has already been extensive in both regions, and is expected to in-
crease with accession. This could have a beneficial impact on firms in certain 
service sectors (notably construction, retailing and tourism) and some manu-
facturing sectors (e.g. wood products and furniture) whose competitiveness 
may grow because of their ability to cut wage costs by hiring CEE workers. 
Small finns with highly localized markets on the border could face greater 
competition as result of integration though - e.g. providers of personal ser-
vices such as hairdressers. Insofar, the impact will greatly depend on when 
free movement of labor between the Union and its new members is fully 
achieved. 
In the non-border regions, in general, the impact of enlargement will be 
less strong, as was expected from a priori considerations. Those regions have 
low levels of trade with the new member countries - though they are ex-
pected to increase in the near-term. The consequences will be more promi-
nent in the labor intensive production sector, which will face some exposure 
to competition to low wage-cost CEE firms now. Insofar, the observation 
made for high and low income border regions seems to be valid here, too. 
However, forcing those region economies to steadily shift to more skills- and 
technology-intensive comparative advantages the problem will disappear. 
Some sectors may remain at risk though, notably those in low-wage and re-
source-dependent sectors, such as wood products, textiles and clothing. 
4. Conclusions and recommendations on the EU policy agenda 
The enlargement of the European Union is one of the challenges that 
European Countries will face in the years ahead. Undoubtedly, the fifth 
enlargement of the EU is the most demanding one both for EU and newcom-
ers. There is little doubt that its overall impact will be positive in the long 
run, however this is not always true for all sectors, regions, and types of en-
terprises, especially during the initial phase of integrating new members into 
the EU. 
By now the greatest part of the debate for the European Union enlarge-
ment has been concentrated mainly on issues such as financial compatibility 
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with the EU budget, institutional rearrangement of the decision making proc-
ess within EU and costs and benefits for the incumbent EU member coun-
tries. However, much lesser attention has been given to the fact that the great 
majority of the new members are transition countries with peculiar funda-
mental needs in the context of their EU accession. 
An efficient way to cope with the overall impact is to get a comprehen-
sive picture of the existing or potential consequences of the enlargement 
separately for EU and new member countries. However, the task of assessing 
the impact of enlargement, is getting more difficult as all new countries do 
not access simultaneously EU and the enlargement is a dynamic long run 
process with many phases for the countries to pass through with unpredict-
able levels of success within each phase. Apart from that the consequences of 
enlargement will be "obvious" long after the accession, as there significant 
delays between impulse and impact. Within this period the international en-
vironment shall change making it more difficult to consider the real impact 
of the enlargement net from external influences. 
In this paper we attempted to present the main directions of the enlarge-
ment impacts. For EU as a whole, the advantages derived from enlargement 
are unquestionable, with the expansion of Internal Market size coming un-
doubtedly first. At the same time, advantages such as increase in competi-
tiveness and so in quality, productivity and business management in some 
sectors, and increase in growth due to higher levels of investment, larger 
workforce and higher overall productivity cannot be ignored as long as EU's 
competitiveness is concerned. However, no one can surely admit that these 
advantages will be equally distributed within member states. 
The consequences of enlargement for sectors, regions, and companies in 
the Union very much depend on the macroeconomic environment at the time 
it occurs. Taking into account the overall upward trend in growth rates, pro-
ductivity and employment one can assume that EU growth will be increasing 
during the years in which EU enlargement will take place, while there is 
space for better results according to more optimistic scenarios. 
On the other hand, for the accession countries although some preliminary 
figures suggest that the expansion will be lower than in the period 1994-
2000, there is evident that growth is based on rather solid ground. Inflation, 
although still high compared the EU figures , is coming down considerably. 
On a sectoral level, apparently there are "opportunity sectors" as well as 
"risk sectors". To the border regions, the enlargement will influence the inte-
gration into the international division of labor substantially, especially 
through labor migration; though many production relocations have already 
taken place. 
The EU enlargement consequences will not be of an exclusively eco-
nomic nature. There will be also political benefits derived from the consoli-
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dation of democratic systems and the respect for human rights. Newcomers 
shall enjoy positive changes in the social and environmental spheres, while 
already great effort has taken place in the area of integration of the new and 
candidate countries in the area offreedom, security and justice. 
The action programs now fonn the cornerstone of Community policy. 
The most recent has been the development of a new multi-annual program 
for enterprise and entrepreneurship to run until 2005. The program has five 
policies: 
• Promoting entrepreneurship as a valuable and productive life skill; 
• Encouraging a business environment in which enterprise, 
entrepreneurship and innovation can flourish; 
• Improving access to finance for finTIs; 
• Enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs in a knowledge-based econ-
omy; and 
• Ensuring that business support networks and services to enterprises 
are sufficiently provided. 
Action programs work both externally to encourage concerted actions 
between Member States, and internally by emphasizing coordination be-
tween enterprise policy and other Community policies and programs. 
In the new work program supporting the 2000-05 enterprise agenda, a se-
ries of priorities and indicative actions have been laid out. First, enterprise 
policy will concentrate on encouraging entrepreneurial activity. To increase 
the number of potential entrepreneurs, increased efforts will be made to pro-
mote the image of entrepreneurs in Europe, greater risk-taking (such as a 
revision of bankruptcy legislation) and the emphasis on "business knowl-
edge" at different levels of education. Access to finance will be improved, 
following a current review of how existing Community financial instruments 
support business start-ups, high-tech finns and very small enterprises. Bu-
reaucratic and regulatory barriers to start-ups and enterprise development 
will also be targeted through simplification of bus iness legislation (e.g. the 
BEST and SLIM programs), more business impact assessment in Commu-
nity legislation and a medium-tenn review of all acquis communitaire for 
their impacts on the business environment. 
The Commission will also continue providing access to inforn1ation and 
advice services. Much of this will be done through the network of Euro Info 
Centers, which were originally appointed "first-stop shops" by the Commis-
sion under the 1997-2000 SME Action Program. They operate as a network 
providing advice, infonnation and assistance on EC issues to enterprises. 
Specific support for the internationalization of SMEs and business coopera-
tion will still be conducted through measures such as the Euro-partenariat 
program. 
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Second, a priority will be placed on providing an environment in which 
business innovation and change is supported. In achieving this priority, sev-
eral areas will be addressed. To help remove the barriers to innovation and 
enterprise change, Commission enterprise policy wi ll reform patenting sys-
tems with the adoption of Community patent and simplify regulatory proce-
dures for introducing new products. For enterprise support policies as a 
whole - and innovation assistance in particular - the Commission will work 
with the Member States to promote the exchange of good policy practice 
through a series of scoreboards, peer review systems and benchmarking stud-
ies. Support will also be provided for developing interregional networks in 
innovation policy and highlighting the implications of the knowledge econ-
omy (especially business services) to EU industry. 
Lastly, enterprise policy will ensure access jor goods and services to 
markets. Central to this will be improving the operation of the Internal Mar-
ket. Annual reviews will identify remaining barriers and outline actions to 
remove them, while appropriate measures will be taken to ensure Member 
State compliance and greater harmonization of product/service conformity 
assessment procedures. More globally, the Commission will continue to 
work towards greater tariff liberalization and regulatory and technical con-
vergence in trade areas. The increasing importance of e-commerce to busi-
ness will also be given more emphasis, as reflected in the Commission' s re-
cent e-Europe initiative, which identified a range of measures to accelerate 
the adoption of e-commerce in Europe. 
The program outlined above will be equally applied to the candidate 
countries as to the existing Member States. In the context of accession, to 
date, the key focus of DG Enterprise has been to open up EU programs to 
participation by enterprises in the accession states, as part of the Commis-
sion ' s pre-accession strategy - integrating candidate countries into EU enter-
prise policy and actions. With the current work program, more efforts will be 
made to integrate the countries of the Europe Agreements into the Internal 
Market through monitoring their confOtmity acceptance procedures as well 
as their adoption of the acquis communitaire. 
Several other points should be taken into account also. 
Fi rst, the scale of policy intervention at EU level should be limited. It is 
clear that EU firms are unlikely to experience distinctive effects from 
enlargement, but rather the direct and indirect impacts typically associated 
with any substantial change in international market opportunities and in-
creased competition from lower-cost producers. From the perspective of ex-
isting EU firms, enlargement as a whole should bring clear _. though modest 
- gains. Where policy action may be required it should be directed more to-
wards assisting small firms to adjust to the restructuring arising from in-
creased competition: as noted below, th is is only likely to be an area of con-
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cern among relatively few groups of these in the existing Community. Sup-
port policies should not aim at preventing the necessary structural change 
and protecting established market positions of the existing enterprises - an 
objective which is not to be aimed at under welf.'lre aspects and which is not 
feasible. 
Second, enlargement does not appear to create new policy needs, but 
perhaps it requires an intens!fication of existing policies (whether those poli-
cies are regional., national or EU in origin). Given that we suggest that the 
impacts of enlargement will be gradual - and not a once-only macroeco-
nomic shock - as well as concentrated on particular groups, the effects are 
likely to involve at most an acceleration of existing restructuring processes, 
particularly in the "sensitive" sectors such as clothing and textiles. The over-
all balance of opportunities and challenges resulting from enlargement is 
positive - as in similar changes in the EU, such as the completion of the in-
ternal market. 
Third, while policy actions should be designed to minimize the difficul-
ties of businesses restructuring in the face of increased competition, policy 
should not prevent such restructuring FOIn taking place. Where difficulties 
may arise because of restructuring, finns require assistance in adjusting to, 
not in preventing these changes from taking place, as is common in other 
sectors needing to adapt to a changing market environment. Insofar, no sec-
tor specific policy is required but a more general approach, helping adjust-
ment and allowing new entries, so that the latter may create those jobs that 
get lost in the "risk" sectors. Indeed, the effects of enlargement are only un-
usual in the changes to the policy environment itself, notably in the potential 
withdrawal of pol icy support in some regions following changes in Structural 
Funds allocation after 2006. 
Fourth, rather than simply be designed not just with the needs of existing 
EU films in mind, policy should also accommodate in the accession coun-
tries and the other candidate states. In these countries, similar enlargement 
challenges exist - greater competition for their domestic markets, new mar-
ket opportunities in the wider EU - but more intensively. In the accession 
countries, overall, they have experienced greater problems with finance, 
management skills, internationalization and increasing productivity than their 
counterparts in the existing EU. Community policies to assist them should be 
pitched and coasted from the perspective of candidate country enterprises as 
much as from EU's. 
Fifth, in suggesting how EU policy can assist these groups, different pol-
icy contexts should be borne in mind. In particular, national and regional 
policies often already provide adequate frameworks to support in adapting to 
restructuring processes. As has always been the case with its policy, EU as-
sistance should complement rather than duplicate measures which are al-
66 European Research Studies, Volume 7, Issue (1-2),2004 
ready being implemented by national and regional authorities; indeed, it is 
perhaps more effective that policies directly influencing the resources avail-
able for growth and development be devised and operated at regional and 
local levels, given the importance of the local economic background in shap-
ing such measures. 
Lastly, the division of policy resp onsibilities within the European Com-
mission must be taken into account. DG Enterprise has recently laid out a 
new policy program for the period 2000-05: within that program, there are 
areas where DG Enterprise policy action can assist to adjust to the implica-
tions of enlargement. The first is the provision of information about new op-
portunities in the markets of aU existing and potential EU Member States. In 
terms of extending the existing coverage of material, this could include in-
formation relating to the specific commercial environments of the candidate 
countries as well as a brokerage service to facilitate commercial cooperation 
between businesses. Such information cannot only assist firms in taking ad-
vantage of the new markets but also in diversifying into new products and 
service areas. At the same time, the provision of these services in the new 
Member States would assist the accession countries to adapt more quickly to 
commercial conditions in the Community. As a result, we recommend the 
continuing use of the Euro-Info Center network as the main system for dis-
semination and encouragement an increasing focus in providing information 
on the candidate countries in advance of their actual accession. 
In this context, more information about the subcontracting implications 
and commercial possibilities arising from enlargement would assist the exist-
ing EU-IS to adapt more rapidly, particularly in potentially groups such. 
There is also a continuing role for support through the cross-border assis-
tance programs. The experience of the case-study regions has underlined the 
value of these programs in assisting regions to adapt to enlargement. In the 
cases of both the Austrian and German regions examined here, INTERREG 
IJA programs involved partners from the candidate countries in joint support 
activities for SMEs. Altbough operated by DG Regional Policy, the report 
recommends that DG Enterprise support the continued existence of the pro-
gram in the context of an enlargement process likely to extend beyond the 
current INTERREG programming period. 
Finally we acknowledge the importance of tbe EU retaining policy flexi-
bility in being able to respond to sector-specific challenges and opportunities 
arising as a result of enlargement. Given the continuing uncertainty of how 
enlargement effects will interact with wider globalization trends to shape the 
development of certain European sectors, it is crucial that the European 
Commission maintains a flexible approach to policy. This means retaining a 
monitoring role on trends among different groups and being prepared to re-
spond to with a series of policy measures if action is warranted. 
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At the same time, it is also irnportant that the EU maximizes the benefits 
of an enlarged market by ensuring that companies in 'opportunity' sectors 
can take full advantage of the changes (Gow and Milner, 1999). This does 
not mean that EU SME policy support should be redirected to assisting the 
'winners' of enlargement. The emphasis of EU policy should be in guaran-
teeing market competition and providing specific assistance to sectors, which 
have difficulties in adjusting to the market changes. However, it does place 
signi fi cance on ensuring market access in these areas, particularly in remov-
ing any remaining baniers in these markets as part of the internal market 
program. Hence, it is recommended that the Commission maintains a particu-
lar sensitivity to the barriers in these sectors to ensure that their growth po-
tential is quickly achieved. Moreover, as with the risk-·sensitive sectors, there 
is an EU role for providing international market infornlation, both in terms of 
the general characteristics of national markets, specific sectoral features and 
individual commercial opportunities (such as joint ventures and sub-
contracting). While it is arguable this is a role, which it shares with national 
authorities with respect to opportunity sectors, the market infon11ation func-
tion is consistent with existing EU activities in this area. 
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